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Professors Macey and Miller explore the relationship between deposit
insurance and the mismatch in the term structure ofcommercial banks I assets
and liabilities. After critiquing the traditional regulatory hypothesis, which
posits that banks have incentives to.fund long-term assets with short-term
liabilities because government-sponsored deposit insurance enhances bank
credit and subsidizes short-term liabilities, they use public choice theory to
argue that a modified version of the regulatory hypothesis is the best
explanation for the mismatch in the term structure of banks I assets and
liabilities. Finally, they argue that embracing the regulatory hypothesis does
not imply acceptance of the government-sponsored deposit insurance scheme
as it exists in the U. S. today.
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Introduction
This Article explores the relationship between deposit insurance and the
mismatch in the term structure of commercial banks' assets and liabilities. Part
I recounts how the mismatch between long-term assets and short-term liabilities
causes much of the instability in the banking system. Part II criticizes the three
principal alternative hypotheses that have been offered to explain this
mismatch: (1) the checking account hypothesis, which posits that access to
information about depositors' checking accounts helps banks assess their
depositors' creditworthiness thereby making it efficient to combine transaction
account services (checking accounts) with long-term lending; (2) the
transformation hypothesis, which posits that banks serve a societal function
by transforming illiquid assets into liquid form; and (3) the i~centive­
compatible intermediation hypothesis, which posits that demand debt stimulates
depositor monitoring and imposes fiscal discipline on bank management by
presenting management with the specter of bank runs. Parts III and IV examine
and critique the traditional regulatory hypothesis, which asserts that banks have
incentives to fund long-term assets with short-term liabilities because
government-sponsored deposit insurance enhances bank credit and subsidizes
short-term liabilities. Part V uses public choice theory to argue that a modified
version of the regulatory hypothesis is the best explanation for the mismatch
in the term structure of banks' assets and liabilities and to argue further that
embracing the regulatory hypothesis does not imply acceptance of the
government-sponsored deposit insurance scheme as it exists in the U.S. today.
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I. The Term Structure Mismatch
Many different types of firms extend credit. Similarly, a variety of non-
bank firms, most notably money market mutual funds and credit card
companies, offer the equivalent of checkable transaction accounts. l What
distinguishes banks from other firms is their capital structure, which is unique
in two ways. First, banks tend to have very little equity relative to other
frrms. 2 While it is not uncommon for manufacturing frrms to finance
themselves with more debt than equity, banks typically receive ninety percent
or more of their funding from debt. 3 Second, banks' liabilities are largely in
the form of deposits that are available to their creditors/depositors on demand,
while their assets are primarily in the form of loans that have longer
maturities.4 The deposit-taking function and the lending function that currently
are combined within banks could easily be unbundled and carried out by
different firms. For example, it has been proposed that a "narrow bank" could
offset demand deposit accounts against short-term, highly liquid money market
instruments, instead of against longer-term, illiquid loans.s Indeed, narrow
banks already exist in the form of money market mutual funds'. Similarly, it
would be possible to fund banks' commercial loan portfolios with a larger
amount of equity or term debt securities, rather than with demand deposit
accounts.
Combining the transactional function with the financial intermediation
function can lead to instability due to the interest rate risk brought about by
this mismatch. Banks become unprofitable whenever short-term interest rates
rise above the rates they receive on the long-term loans they hold in inventory.
There are a variety of strategies available to banks for avoiding interest rate
risk, including decreasin~ the maturity of assets, increasing the duration of
liabilities, and hedging in the financial futures markets. Nevertheless, interest
rate risk remains a considerable source of potential instability for the banking
system. 6
Combining the transactional and commercial lending functions may also
cause a collective action problem among depositors, because banks keep only
I. See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Nondeposit Accounts and the Future ofBank
Regulation, 91 MICH. L. REv. 237 (1992). .
2. See generally Mark J. Roe, Some Differences in Corporate Structure in Germany, Japan, and
the United States, 102 YALE L.J. 1927, 1984 (1993).
3. Book value leverage (the ratio of debt to total liabilities and capital) for industrial fmns has
traditionally run at thirty-three percent, but has increased in recent years to over forty percent. In
contrast, book value leverage at commercial banks is over ninety percent. JONATHAN R. MACEY &
GEOFFREY P. MILLER, BANKING LAw AND REGULATION 57 (\992).
4. Id. at 58-59.
5. Leonard I. Nakamura, Commercial Bank Information: Implicationsfor the Structure ofBanking,
in STRUCTURAL CHANGE IN BANKING 131, 134-36 (Michael Klausner & Lawrence J. White eds., 1993).
6. Id. at 58.
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a fraction of deposits on reserve at anyone time.? As a result, banks do not
have sufficient funds on hand to satisfy all depositors at once. If a substantial
portion of a bank's depositors wanted to withdraw their funds at one time, the
bank would be forced to liquidate assets at distress prices. Such a liquidation
would render the bank insolvent and jeopardize the interests of those depositors
who were not attempting to obtain immediate repayment.
Thus, the argument goes, if bad news circulates about a bank and some
depositor decides to withdraw his funds from the bank, other depositors may
rationally conclude that they must do the same to avoid being left with nothing.
In other words, because the first depositors to attempt to reclaim their funds
will be repaid in full, while, in the absence of government guarantees, the last
depositors will not receive anything, a me-first mentality is likely to sweep
depositors into a mad frenzy to reclaim their funds.
According to this analysis, bank failures can occur even in solvent banks.
Such failures occur because "the existence of bank runs does not require any
loss in the value of the underlying assets [of the bank]. Even without
exogenous fluctuations in the real or nominal value of bank assets, runs can
occur since the cost of liquidating assets can make a run self-fulftlling."8 The
idea that the collective action problem among bank depositors can cause the
failure of a solvent bank is often used to justify special regulatory treatment
for banks. Deposit insurance aims to solve this collective action problem by
eliminating the incentive for any single depositor to rush to demand repayment
of his deposits.
This analysis is flawed because it does not take into account the ability
of markets to solve the collective action problem among depositors at low cost
through private contracts between banks and their depositors. The reason the
collective action problem exists is the asymmetry between the maturity
structure of banks' assets and their liabilities. But there is nothing to prevent
banks from tailoring their asset portfolios to match their liabilities by
purchasing highly liquid, short-term assets. Such tailoring would greatly
mitigate the collective action problem facing depositors. Thus, to understand
the persistence of the mismatch in the term structure of banks' assets and
liabilities, one should consider whether there are independent economic
explanations of the phenomenon.
7. Under current law, depository institutions generally must hold ten percent of the amount of
their transaction deposits in reserve. MACEY & MILLER, supra note I, at 238-39.
8. Douglas W. Diamond & Philip H. Dybvig, Banking Theory. Deposit Insurance. and Bank
Regu/alion, 59 J. Bus. 55, 63 (1986).
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II. Three Traditional Hypotheses That Do Not Fully Explain the Term
Structure Mismatch
A. The Checking Account Hypothesis
One explanation for the fact that banks combine the deposit-taking function
and the lending function within a single fIrm is that these services generate
economies of scope: banks gain an economic advantage over other possible
lenders through greater access to borrowers' fInancial information. 9 This
combination may enable banks to obtain reliable information about the
investment decisions of the fIrms to which they have loaned money. Deposit-
taking provides an important source of information to banks about their lending
activities. By observing the checks written against a commercial customer's
checking account as well as the flow of deposits into the account, a bank loan
officer can determine the size of the borrower's payroll, the salaries of the
fIrm's key personnel, the amount of money paid for supplies, the identity of
the fIrm's key customers, and the seasonal pattern of the fIrm's receipts. This
information may give banks a signifIcant competitive advantage over other
intermediaries.
Under the checking account hypothesis, combining fInancial intermediation
with transactional services enables banks to be effective monitors of borrowers
because of the banks' privileged access to current information about the
fInancial condition of those borrowers after the loans have been made. 10
However, the advance of computer technology has dramatically reduced the
costs of recording, transmitting, and processing information. Computers have
made it possible for non-bank lenders, such as commercial fInance companies,
to obtain the information they need about borrowers without the necessity of
offering checking accounts. For example, computer-based retail information
processing services can provide lenders with detailed information about the
cash flows and inventories of borrowers that is more current than the
information revealed by checking account activity. 11 In other words, advanced
technology has made it possible for fIrms that compete with banks for
commercial loans to obtain virtually the same timely credit and market
information that was once available only to banks. 12 For example, fmance
companies that are funded with commercial paper have begun to compete with
banks. By the end of 1991, fInance companies had $315 billion in loans
9. Nakamura, supra note 5, at 133.
10. Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Po/jlicizatjon ofa Social Problem, 45 STAN.
L. REv. 289, 294-98 (1992).
11. See Jonathan R. Macey, The Inevitability of Universal Banking, 19 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 203,
214-16 (1993).
12. Alan Greenspan, Statement Before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban
Affairs (December 1, 1987), in 74 FED. REs. BULL., February 1988, at 92,93-94.
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outstanding to U.S. customers. This figure is almost one-half of the $650
billion in commercial loans outstanding at the time. 13
Current evidence indicates that banks generally do not have an
informational advantage over other lenders. While weak support for the
validity of the checking account hypothesis has come from studies showing that
announcements of bank loan agreements are followed by positive abnormal
stock returns for borrowers,14 these studies are inconclusive. They do not
compare the performance of firms borrowing from banks with that of fIrms
borrowing under similar conditions from non-bank fIrms. Moreover, Dianna
Preece and Donald Mullineaux have studied stock price reactions to loan
announcements and found that loan agreements with non-bank lenders
increased returns to the same extent as loan agreements with bank lenders. IS
They also found that the number of lenders is an important factor in increasing
borrower returns. Both findings are inconsistent with the checking account
hypothesis, since it is unlikely that multiple lenders will be able to monitor
checking account information as well as a single lender.
Even the strongest proponents of the checking account hypothesis
acknowledge that checking accounts are of most value for monitoring small
businesses. A small, single-location business will usually have a single
checking account whose information is readily accessible and interpretable by
the lender. 16 In the U.S. and Europe, the growth of national and multinational
firms with many locations, coupled with unusually restrictive rules on
branching in the U.S., has hastened the demise of the checking account
hypothesis. Moreover, U.S. fIrms doing business in multiple states often must
have several banks because the regulatory prohibition on branch banking means
that firms' primary banks are unable to expand geographically to meet their
clients' needs. Even without such a prohibition, banks would be unlikely to
find it cost-effective to follow all of their clients' business, since it is unlikely
that all of their clients would expand to the same places.
Thus, although the checking account hypothesis may have had some
validity in the past, it is no longer valid, at least for large borrowers, because
there are other, better ways for lenders to obtain information about large
borrowers than by monitoring transaction accounts. The need for information
that is only available through maintaining transaction accounts cannot justify
funding long-term illiquid loans with demand deposits except in the case of
small banks lending to small borrowers. Indeed, for small borrowers there is
13. [d.
14. Christopher James, Some Evidence on the Uniqueness ofBank Loans, 19 J. FIN. BeON. 217,
218-19 (1987).
IS. Dianna Preece & Donald J. Mullineaux, Monitoring, Contractual Flexibility, and the Capital
Market Response to Loan Agreement Announcements (1991) (unpublished manuscript, University of
Kentucky).
16. Nakamura, supra note 5, at 133.
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substantial evidence that the checking account hypothesis retains some
validity.n These firms tend to use a single, local bank for their credit and
checking needs. IS
B. The Transfonnation Hypothesis
An alternative explanation for the term structure mismatch is the
transformation hypothesis offered by Douglas Diamond and Philip Dybvig. 19
The transformation occurs when iIliquid investments are transformed into what
are, from the depositors' perspective, extremely liquid investments (demand
deposits). As Diamond and Dybvig observe, "[b]anks are able to transform
illiquid assets (into liquid assets) by offering liabilities with a different,
smoother pattern of returns . . . . Illiquidity of assets provides the rationale
for the existence of banks [the combination of transactions services with
commercial loans]. "20
A liquid investment is one that the investor can convert into cash at a
price close to the present value of the future cash flows of the investment
whenever the investor so desires. All else equal, of course, investors prefer
to hold liquid investments rather than illiquid ones. Consequently, borrowers
forced to offer potential investors illiquid assets must offer such investors a
greater return to compensate them for the additional inconvenience of
illiquidity. Banks, by issuing demand deposits, "can improve on a competitive
market by providing better risk sharing among people who need to consume
at different random times. "21
Thus, banks improve the operation of the economy by investing in
portfolios of illiquid assets and by offering depositors liquid claims (deposits)
on the banks' own assets. This conversion of iIliquid investments into liquid
ones provides a significant benefit to investors-and to borrowers as well.
Consider a manufacturing firm with an asset that cannot be used to pay current
operating expenses because it is not generating any income at present. Suppose
further that obtaining the information necessary to value the future income that
will be generated by this asset is very costly to obtain and verify. This asset
is illiquid. If, however, the firm can obtain a loan from a bank secured by the
asset, it can convert a substantial portion of the asset's value into liquid form
17. See id. at 137.
18. Ninety-one percent of small businesses that have bank lines of credit have checking accounts
at the same bank. Gregory E. Eliiehausen & John D. Wolken, Banking Markets and rhe Use ofFinancial
Services by Small and Medium-Sized Businesses, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System Staff
Studies 160 (1990).
19. Douglas W. Diamond & Philip H. Dybvig, Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity,
911. PoL. EcON. 401, 403 (1983).
20. Id. at 403.
21. Id. at 402.
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while continuing to control the plant. Banks' ability to sell their skill at valuing
assets, their ability to allow investors and borrowers to realize economies of
scale in investing, and their ability to convert illiquid investments into liquid
investments all explain why banks have survived and prospered even though
financial intermediation is costly to both lenders (depositors) and borrowers.
Thus, under the transformation hypothesis, the role that banks play in the
economy arises from imperfect information and from the costliness of
arranging direct investor-borrower transactions. According to Diamond and
Dybvig, economic models of asset services
focus on the role of banks' information gathering in the lending
process. What is particularly important is information that cannot
easily be made public. This includes both information gathered while
evaluating the loan (to limit adverse selection) and information
gathered in monitoring the loan (to limit moral hazard). In these
models, getting a loan from a bank dominates a public debt offering
when the cost to the public of evaluating and monitoring the
borrower is high. Getting a loan from a bank dominates borrowing
from an individual because bank lending can keep both risk-sharing
(diversification) costs and information (evaluation and monitoring)
costs low.22
As with the checking account hypothesis the validity of the transformation
hypothesis has been undermined by technology. Technological advances have
reduced demand for the transformation services traditionally supplied by banks.
Money market mutual funds permit depositors to transform cash into highly
liquid claims, and securitization allows borrowers to convert illiquid assets into
cash. Thus, for example, the percentage of U.S. financial sector assets on
deposit in banks fell from 57% in 1978 to 33% in 1991.23 During this same
period, mutual funds and pension funds increased their market share from 11 %
to 25%.24 On the liability side, commercial paper issued by investment banks
came to be seen as a superior alternative to bank loans by the largest, highest
quality borrowers. At the end of 1991, non-financial corporations were raising
$107 billion annually from commercial paper in funding operations that a
decade ago had been conducted through bank borrowing.25
22. Diamond and Dybvig. supra note 8. at 58.
23. Robert Glauber. 4 NEWSLETTER LoNDON Bus. SCH. INST. FIN. & ACCT. 4 (1992-93).
24. Id.
25. Id. This figure is approximately twenty percent of the total money raised through banks. Id.
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The transformation described by Diamond and Dybvig simply represents
a straightforward account of the securitization phenomenon. 26 The process
they describe is seen in the securitization of home mortgages and credit card
receivables, the process of issuing commercial paper, and even the process of
investing in the securities of publicly held fIrms, so long as those securities
are highly liquid. Thus, the transformation hypothesis is inaccurate to the
extent that it implies that commercial banks represent the only mechanism by
which illiquid assets can be transformed into liquid assets.
Under the transformation hypothesis, the demand for banks' services
arises from imperfect information and from the costliness of arranging direct
investor-borrower transactions. Consequently, it stands to reason that the
demand for these services will decline as markets develop, and in particular
as the costs of organizing and communicating information and arranging
fInancial transactions fall. As markets develop, other intermediaries besides
commercial banks emerge to provide funds to particularly large borrowers,
and banks cease to be unique in this respect. Insurance companies, pension
funds, and open-end mutual funds also provide ~ansformation services by
taking funds from policy-holders and investors and investing that money in
productive assets. Thus, investors in developed economies now have many
mechanisms for pooling their funds with other investors to overcome the
transformation problem described by Diamond and Dybvig.
Moreover, new assets that provide transformation services are continually
being designed. For example, in 1990, mM Credit Corporation registered $2
billion in Variable Denomination Floating Rate Demand NotesY Investments
in these notes are in pure book-entry form and not represented by certifIcates.
When investments are made, investors receive a credit in a special account
established for each investor by a bank. The principal amount of each note is
equivalent to the initial investment, plus all accrued and reinvested interest and
principal, less the amount of redemptions and fees. The notes have no stated
maturity, and are payable on demand in whole or in part. They earn interest
at a floating rate determined by an ffiM committee, but the rate always exceeds
the seven-day average yield of taxable money market funds in the United
States. mM uses the funds it receives from these securities in its general
fInancing business.
These accounts are functionally identical to demand deposit accounts at
commercial banks. mM and its investors receive the same transformation
26. Securitization (structured finance) is a process by which a company that seeks to raise cash
sells certain of its assets, typically payment obligations, to a special-purpose vehicle or trust, which pays
for the issue through bond issues secured by the assets. The frrst structured financing took place in the
early 1970's with the securitization of pools of mortgages and has since expanded rapidly. See generally
STEVEN L. SCHWARCZ, STRUCTURED FINANCE (2d ed. 1993).
27. ffiM CREDIT CORPORATION PROSPECTUS 1-14 (Sept. 21, 1990).
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services received by depositors in commercial banks. Initial investments are
as low as $2500, and additional investments of as little as $100 may be made.
Drafts (checks) may be written against these accounts in amounts of $500 or
more. The IBM money market fund differs from money market mutual funds
in that it is an equity investment. Rather, like checking depositors, investors
are promised the return of the full amount of their initial investment, plus
accrued interest at a variable rate determined by an independent, objective
measure.
The demand for bankers' skill in evaluating particular investments, which
is an important part of the transformation hypothesis, should be expected to
decline as secondary and new issues markets for securities develop. As
secondary capital markets develop, business fIrms will fInd it increasingly easy
to raise capital by making public offerings. The sophistication of the trading
markets provides a dependable price-setting mechanism that permits investors
to rely on anonymous market forces rather than on the judgment of particular
bankers to determine the appropriate prices for investments. In addition,
trading markets such as the New York Stock Exchange compete directly with
banks' ability to transform illiquid investments into liquid investments for the
benefIt of depositors.
In light of the large and growing number of mechanisms for transforming
illiquid investments into liquid form, at least in developed market
economies,28 the transformation hypothesis loses much of its force as a
justifIcation for the argument that banks are special and therefore in need of
special regulatory treatment, such as deposit insurance.
C. The Demandable Debt and Incentive-Compatible Intennediation
Hypothesis
Charles Calomiris and Charles Kahn offer an interesting and important
explanation of demandable debt based on the monitoring problem faced by
bank depositors seeking to control bank managers who may either abscond with
their funds or engage in other activities detrimental to depositors' interests.29
According to Calomiris and Kahn, since bank managers have an informational
advantage over depositors as to which projects to fInance, they can fund
28. Clearly, the arguments presented above about the demise of the checking account hypothesis
and the transfonnation hypothesis do not apply with equal force in both developing countries and
developed countries. In countries without developed securities markets, the infonnation provided by
checking accounts may well be an excellent source of infonnation about the cash flows to borrowers.
In banking markets where this is the case, the economies of scope between checking account services
and commercial lending may still exist, though they may have disappeared from more highly developed
markets.
29. Charles W. Calomiris & Charles M. Kahn, 17Je Role of DellUl1ldoble Debt in Structuring
Optimal Banking Arrangements, 81 AM. EcON. REv. 497 (1991).
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projects that transfer wealth from the depositors to themselves. In the
Calomiris and Kahn model, demandable debt acts as a monitoring device
because depositors can take their money out of the bank if they become
suspicious that management is making inappropriate asset decisions. Ifenough
depositors feel that managers are misbehaving, the bank will liquidate and
close. Because banks repay depositors on a frrst-come-frrst-served basis, those
who invest in monitoring will be the frrst to discover that bank managers are
engaging in risky activities and will be the first in line to demand repayment.
This in turn provides a pay-off to monitoring:
The monitors pay the costs of vigilance but receive the benefit of
knowing that they will be "first in line" (and thereby receive a higher
payment than other depositors) should it become necessary to
withdraw their funds from the bank. The depositors who do not
monitor are willing to pay the price Of being last in line in "bad"
states, because they receive a benefit in return; the active monitors
keep the banker in line and thereby provide a benefit to the passive
depositors. Depositors need not reveal whether they are active or
passive; the same contract works for both types.30
Monitors benefit from monitoring because they can get their money out before
the bankers can abscond or otherwise behave inappropriately in bad times.
Non-monitors benefit because monitoring by others reduces the probability of
absconding, and because it provides non-monitors with the valuable
information that monitors have not called for liquidation.
While interesting and provocative, the incentive incompatibility hypothesis
is unconvincing for several reasons. First, the benefits for non-monitoring
depositors are far from clear. Bankers may still abscond or make inappropriate
investments as long as they leave enough funds in the bank to repay all of the
monitoring depositors.
A second shortcoming of Calomiris and Kahn's analysis is that, as with
the checking account hypothesis and the transformation process, market
developments and technological change raise doubts about its continued
validity:
[O]ur framework does not consider the possibility of trade in bank
shares. Unlike the historical context in which demandable debt arose,
in today's more sophisticated financial markets, shares of financial
intermediaries are actively traded. In this richer context, equity
trading could conceivably provide a superior disciplinary alternative
30. [d. at 500.
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to demandable debt and contingent liquidation. For example,
leveraged buy-outs offer a possible alternative means to prevent
managerial misconduct and provide rewards that make monitoring
incentive-compatible.31
Finally, a more important problem with the incentive compatibility
hypothesis, for purposes of this analysis, is that it does not explain the
persistence of demand debt and long-term lending within a single firm in
today's highly regulated banking environment. As Calomiris and Kahn
acknowledge, "[i]n today's more regulated environment, where ... deposit
insurance makes depositor monitoring less. important, demandable debt may
persist simply as an artifact of regulation. "32 The Calomiris and Kahn account
of the mismatch in the term structure of banks' balance sheets is not consistent
with the existence of deposit insurance. Unlike Diamond and Dybvig's
transformation hypothesis, which posits that deposit insurance is potentially
desirable to facilitate the transformation of illiquid assets into liquid form,
Calomiris and Kahn's analysis presumes that deposit insurance does not exist.
Once deposit insurance is introduced, the incentives to monitor disappear for
all insured depositors.
III. The Regulatory Hypothesis as an Explanation for the Term
Structure Mismatch
An alternative explanation for the combination of financial intermediation
and transactional services within banking organizations is that the explicit and
implicit guarantees for depositors provided by both formal deposit insurance
programs and regulatory policy afford a significant degree of credit
enhancement for banks. According to the regulatory hypothesis, the credit
enhancement provided by the explicit and implicit government guarantees
enables banks to fund their lending activities more cheaply through deposits
than through other means, such as equity, commercial paper, or other forms
of debt. The regulatory hypothesis does not posit any necessary economic role
for the mismatch in the term structure of banks' assets and liabilities. Rather,
the mismatch is due to banks' efforts to maximize the amount of the subsidy
they enjoy over other intermediaries in the form of explicit or implicit deposit
insurance.
There are two obvious objections to the regulatory hypothesis. First,
deposit insurance protection is not restricted to short-term bank liabilities like
checkable transaction accounts, but extends equally to long-term certificates
31. [d. at 510.
32. [d.
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of deposit (CDs). Thus, the regulatory hypothesis must account for the fact
that banks persist in utilizing short-term demand deposit accounts as their
primary source of funding. One reason banks prefer demand deposit accounts
over other forms of insured liabilities is that the interest rate that banks must
pay to attract these sorts of accounts is usually lower than for insured accounts
with longer maturities. The fact that banks prefer to offer short-term liabilities
rather than longer-term liabilities may be consistent with the regulatory
hypothesis because banks can maximize the amount of the regulatory subsidy
by offering short-term liability accounts.
Moreover, it is likely that the greater competition among issuers of longer-
term, state-backed securities makes it more attractive for banks to offer short-
term deposit accounts. Longer-term securities issued directly by the
government, or by government agencies, are a superior substitute for bank
CDs because the secondary trading markets for these securities provide owners
with liquidity unavailable to CD owners. Finally, by offering checking
accounts, banks are able to obtain funding from relatively small savers whose
liquidity needs make their demand for checking accounts highly inelastic.
A second objection to the regulatory hypothesis is that it does not account
for the fact that the mismatch in the term structure of banks' assets and
liabilities existed prior to the introduction of deposit insurance. 33 Since the
pervasive mismatch in the term structure of banks' assets and liabilities
predates the introduction of government subsidies in the form of deposit
insurance, the mismatch cannot be explained by those subsidies. In fact, the
evidence clearly shows that combining transaction accounts with financial
intermediation was quite costly prior to the introduction of deposit insurance,
because depositors demanded compensation for the risks of placing their funds
in potentially unstable firms. In the United States and other countries this
problem was dealt with through the introduction of a system of multiple
liability for bank shareholders. 34 Under this system, shareholders obligated
themselves to contribute additional capital, calibrated as a multiple of their
initial investment (usually either two or three times the amount of the initial
investment), in order to provide the credit enhancement necessary to attract
depositors' funds to the bank. Although these multiple liability programs
33. Banks have issued some kind of demandable debt since the Roman Empire. Id. at 509. For
centuries, the term structure mismatch has been the preferred method for funding the vast majority of
extemally-fmancedinvestments.Id.at 497. Federal deposit insurance, in contrast, is a result of the New
Deal. Anna J. Schwan, Financial Stability and the Federal Safety Net, in REsTRUCTURING BANKING
AND FINANCIAL SERVICES IN AMERICA 47 (William S. Haraf & Rose Marie Schneider eds., 1988); see
also Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Double Uability of Bank Slulreholders: History and
Implications, 27 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 31, 38 (1992).
34. Macey & Miller, supra note 33, at 31.
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. reduced the amount of capital stated on the banks' books, they considerably
increased the banks' effective cost of capital.35
Viewed from a historical perspective, the checking account hypothesis
and the transformation hypothesis provided the most convincing explanation
for the mismatch in the term structure of banks' assets and liabilities.
Combining financial intermediation with transactional services may have been
the only way for the economy to transform illiquid assets into liquid funds. As
technology evolved and markets developed, however, superior mechanisms for
monitoring borrowers emerged and the economies of scope in combining
checking account services and financial intermediation disappeared. With the
emergence of alternative financing vehicles, particularly securitization, the
economy can operate without the transformation services provided by banks.
Thus, while the regulatory hypothesis cannot explain the peculiar nature of
banks' balance sheets prior to the introduction of government-sponsored
depositor protection schemes, it is undoubtedly the most convincing explanation
today.
The point here is not that the checking account hypothesis and the
transformation hypothesis are wholly unpersuasive as theories for explaining
why firms choose to combine transaction account services with commercial
lending. Rather, it appears that both of these theories continue to have some
validity in that they provide at least partial explanations for the term structure
of banks' balance sheets. As markets and technology have developed over
time, however, the regulatory hypothesis has emerged as the dominant
explanation.
IV. The Inadequacy of the Regulatory Hypothesis as an Economic
Justification for Federal Deposit Insurance
While a strong argument can be made that the basic justification for the
existence of deposit insurance is the mismatch between the term structure of
banks' assets and liabilities, the regulatory hypothesis holds that the reason for
the continued mismatch is the subsidy that deposit insurance provides. If the
regulatory hypothesis is valid, the obvious thing to do would be to abolish
government-sponsored deposit insurance. This would eliminate the subsidy
given to banks that offer transaction accounts, and cause them voluntarily to
correct the term structure mismatch. Ironically, therefore, abolishing deposit
insurance removes the need for it, unless some other justification for it
independent of the mismatch can be offered.
Moreover, eliminating deposit insurance would eliminate the need for
much of the rest of bank regulation as well. Minimum capital requirements,
35. [d. at 60.
14
HeinOnline -- 12 Yale J. on Reg. 15 1995
Deposit Insurance
limits on lending to particular borrowers, limitations on banks' activities, and
restrictions on banks' ability to borrow can be justified on the grounds that
they are necessary to protect the government against losses to which the system
of guarantees exposes it.
In light of the preceding analysis, the question that remains is whether
there is ajustification for deposit insurance that is independent of the mismatch
in the term structure of assets and deposit liabilities. Besides the collective
action problem caused by the mismatch in the term structure of banks' assets
and liabilities, two other economic justifications for government-sponsored
deposit insurance have been offered. The first concerns banks' unique role in
the payments system and the second concerns the information problems that
plague depositors, making them unable to fend for themselves as consumers
of banking services.
A. The Unique Role of Banks in the Payments System
It is frequently asserted that government guarantees are necessary to
provide a transparent payments system-one in which those accepting checks
can worry about the credit worthiness of the check writer without concern for
the stability ofthe intermediating financial institutions. Additionally, the special
treatment of banks has been justified on the grounds that they clear transactions
and hold large inventories of currency. These justifications should be
reconsidered. For years, money market funds, brokers' asset management
accounts, and credit cards have competed directly with banks both in providing
secure and liquid stores of funds and in clearing transactions.36 These changes
in payments technology have weakened the link between the money supply and
bank deposits. The emergence of competition for liquidity services dictates that
any regulation designed to protect the payments system or permit regulators
to conduct monetary policy should apply to all financial intermediaries
performing such services, not just banks. 37
B. The Infonnational Problems Among Depositors
Another argument that is often used to justify special government
protection for banks is that many depositors are small savers who have neither
the sophistication to evaluate the riskiness of the intermediaries they entrust
36. Diamond & Dybvig, supra note 8, at 61-62.
37. The argument that banks no longer playa unique role in the payments system is particularly
strong in Europe. There, non-bank firms such as OM Gruppen AB in London and Stockholm routinely
clear money market instruments and derivative products, such as options and futures on stocks and stock
indices. Jonathan R. Macey, The Future Regularion and Development a/the Swedish Banking Industry
(Occasional Paper No. 56, Center for Business and Policy Studies, May 1994), at 23-24; see also
Glauber, supra note 23, at 500.
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with their savings nor the expertise to develop contractual solutions to deal
with this risk. This argument also merits skepticism. In an environment without
government guarantees, small depositors needing extra protection would be
able to purchase it from private insurers. Moreover, if permitted by law, banks
could guarantee depositors' funds on the basis of the personal liability of the
banks' shareholders or by investing these deposits in government-backed
securities.
There is a strong economic argument against government protection of
depositors (or their private sector co-insurers) in the event of bank failure. This
argument is based on the notion that private sector actors have an incentive
to monitor their banks only if they (or their guarantors) face some risk of
loss.38 Depositor monitoring, in turn, plays an important role in strengthening
the banking system by imposing a kind of market discipline upon banks. Such
discipline reduces banks' proclivities for excessive risk-taking.
Depositor monitoring can best be understood through simple marginal cost
analysis. In the absence of implicit or explicit government guarantees,
depositors can be expected to monitor and constrain banks' risk-taking until
the cost of an additional unit of monitoring exceeds its benefit. Monitoring
costs come from researching the solvency and future prospects of banks,
drafting restrictions on banks' investment policies, and developing reporting
systems to monitor adherence to restrictive agreements; monitoring benefits
come in the form of a higher probability of repayment by the bank. Moreover,
as the Calomiris and Kahn analysis described above indicates, effective
depositor monitoring does not require that all depositors serve as effective
monitors. 39 A bank can be effectively monitored by a relatively small number
of depositors, because even a few monitors can start a crippling run by
withdrawing their funds if they think bank management is taking excessive
risks.40
It has been argued that market discipline by depositors will manifest itself
in the precipitous withdrawals of uninsured funds on the basis of unfounded
rumors. This argument is based on the incorrect assumption that the low cost
of withdrawal from checking accounts implies that depositors will not impose
constraints on bank risk-taking, but instead will simply withdraw their funds
in anticipation of an impending bank failure. 41 The precipitous withdrawal
argument suffers from three principal weaknesses. First, while it is true that
it is not costly for uninsured depositors to withdraw their funds, they must
38. Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Bank Failures, Risk Moniloring, and lhe Markel
for Bank Control, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1153 (1988).
39. See supra Part n.c.
40. Calomiris & Kahn, supra note 29, at 500.
41. Helen Garten, BanJdng on lhe Markel: Relying on Deposilors 10 Control Bank Risk, 4 YALE
J. ON REo. 129, 153-57 (1986).
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incur search costs in finding an alternative repository for these funds. Second,
the argument presupposes a race among uninsured depositors to withdraw their
money from a troubled bank, but since each depositor faces a risk of losing
this race he has an incentive to engage in monitoring. Similarly, the threat of
precipitous withdrawals provides bankers with an incentive to furnish uninsured
depositors with current information about the state of the bank-or to change
the terms of their contractual agreements with borrowers. Consequently, the
threat of depositor withdrawal is likely to have a beneficial rather than a
harmful effect on depositors, particularly when large, sophisticated depositors
perform the monitoring.
Finally, the argument that monitoring by uninsured depositors will lead
to bank runs misses the point that, contrary to popular myth, bank runs are
not spontaneous events that strike randomly at strong banks and weak banks
alike. Bank runs occur because banks have badly-managed loan portfolios or
other excessive exposure to risk.42 In other words, the available empirical
evidence indicates that bank runs occur on banks that require market
discipline.43 Thus, the withdrawal of depositor funds from isolated banks
should be viewed as an indication that depositors are monitoring their banks,
not as a sign of market failure.
V. A Public Choice Explanation for Deposit Insurance
The public choice (or interest group) theory of regulation "asserts that
legislation is a good demanded and supplied much as other goods, so that
legislative protection flows to those groups that derive the greatest value from
it, regardless of overall social welfare."44 In other words, the public choice
theory of regulation applies generally accepted principles of rational economic
behavior to decisions made by politicians, bureaucrats, and interest groups.
This theory leads to predictions that are quite different than those of the
traditional public interest theory of regulation, which holds that regulation is
42. Cates, Management Discipline: The True Bulwark Against Ban/dng Crisis, IssUES IN BANK
REG., Winter 1985, at 4, 4-5.
43. T. HANNAN & G. HANWECK, FIN. STRUCTURE SECTtON, DIV. OF REsEARCH AND
STATISTICS, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. REsERVE SYs., WORKING PAPER IN BANKING, FINANCE,
AND MICROECONOMICS, No. 86-1, BANK INSOLVENCY RISK AND THE MARKET FOR LARGE
CERTIFICATES OF DEPOSIT (Apr. 1986) (observing interest rate data for certificates of deposit of five
different maturities at 300 different banks and concluding that market exacts a price for risk taking);
Eugenie D.Short, Bank Problems and Financial Safety Nets, BeoN. REv. FED. REs. BANK DALLAS,
Mar. 1987, at 17, 25-26 (describing evidence suggesting depositors in medium and small sized banks
demand higher risk premiums from problem banks), Helbert Baer & Elijah Brewer, Uninsured Deposlts
as a Source ofMarket Discipline: Some New Evidence, BeON. PERSP. OF THE FED. RESERVE BANK
CHICAGO, Sept./Oct. 1986, at 23 (examining ratio of equity market value to total assets and variance
of returns on bank equity and concluding that uninsured depositors exert market discipline on banks).
44. Richard A. Posner, Economics, Politics, and the Reading of StatUles, 49 U. CHI. L. REv.
263, 265 (1982).
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designed to benefit the public by solving collective action problems and other
sorts of market failures. 4s Public choice theory holds that political decision-
makers behave much like private sector consumers and businesses-they
attempt to maximize their own utility, often at the expense of overall societal
welfare.46
A. Self-Interested Behavior ofAffected Groups
Under the public choice theory of regulation, interested parties form
distributional coalitions in order to trade resources, in the form of influence,
money, and power, in exchange for regulations that provide private benefits
to the coalitions' members. The public choice theory of regulation focuses on
the differing organizational costs that face rival political coalitions. The theory
assumes that a political coalition will form when the benefits from achieving
wealth transfers from the legislature outweigh the costs of organizing. For a
number of reasons, some groups will be able to organize into distributional
coalitions more cheaply than others.41 In particular, groups that have already
formed into coalitions for other reasons, such as mutual professional interests
(lawyers, doctors, bankers), will find that the marginal costs of diverting their
activities to the political arena are far outweighed by the benefits from the
favorable legislation such activities can procure.48
The public choice theory of regulation recognizes that well-organized
special interest groups are better able to provide the political support that
politicians need for survival than are highly diffuse, disorganized citizens.
Consequently, politicians who are unable or unwilling to satisfy interest group
constituents will be driven from office by rival politicians more capable of
supplying the laws that interest groups demand. To take a simple example,
suppose a proposed piece of legislation would cost the U.S. public $250
million and would transfer $100 million to a particular interest group. The 250
million individual members of the public who would pay for this legislation
through additional taxes of $1.00 (or, more likely, a share of the interest on
additional governmental borrowing of $250 million) would not find it in their
interest to organize into an effective political coalition to oppose this wealth
transfer. The costs of organizing and obtaining information about the merits
of the proposed legislation would be many times greater than the $1.00 per
person cost of the legislation. Consequently, it would be rational for most
45. See ROBERT E. MCCORMICK & ROBERT D. TOLLISON, PoLITICIANS, LEGISLATION, AND THE
EcONOMY: AN INQUIRY INTO THE INTEREST-GROUP THEORY OF GOVERNMENT 3 (1981).
46. See id. at 5.
47. Id. at 16-18; see also MANCUR OLSON, THE RISE AND DECLINE OF NATIONS: EcONOMIC
GROWTH, STAGFLATION AND SOCIAL RIGIDITIES 18 (1982); Geoffrey P. Miller, Public Choice at the
Dawn of the Special Interest State: The Story of Butter and Margarine, 77 CAL. L. REv. 83 (1989).
48. See Miller, supra note 47.
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individuals to remain ignorant about the effects of the proposed wealth transfer
rather than to incur the information and organizational costs necessary to
become informed and oppose it effectively. By contrast, the well-organized
interest group beneficiary of the regulation would pay up to the full amount
of the proposed wealth transfer in order to achieve passage of the legislation
that effects the transfer.
Thus, although qualifications are sometimes in order, a useful
generalization is that the public choice theory of regulation posits that
legislation will be characterized by concentrated benefits for discrete groups
and widely dispersed costs. This is because legislatures pass laws to benefit
those groups that are able to pay for or trade political support in exchange for
obtaining passage of such laws. The costs of legislation are borne by those who
are in the worst position to object to them-the amorphous and disaggregated
public. Moreover, the realities of the political marketplace provide strong
incentives for politicians themselves to search actively for issues in which the
winners are easily identified and the losers are poorly identified.49 Legislation
that benefits special interest groups is paid for by the losers through higher
taxes, increased regulatory burdens at all levels, and higher prices for goods
and services. 50
B. Banks as Economic Beneficiaries ofDeposit Insurance
Applying the public choice theory of regulation to the issue of deposit
insurance, the logic of protecting depositors is clear. The primary beneficiaries
of this sort of protection are the banks themselves: government guarantees of
their liabilities enhance their credit and therefore lower their costs of doing
business. sl Government guarantees of bank liabilities are less helpful to
depositors than they appear, since some, if not all, of the benefits of credit
enhancement are eroded by the lower interest rates banks must pay for
deposits. The distinct political advantage of government guarantees of bank
liabilities is that such guarantees rarely, if ever, meet with concerted political
opposition. This is because the diffuse citizens who must bear the costs of
these programs generally view themselves as beneficiaries of the schemes,
which are marketed by bureaucrats, politicians and interest groups as consumer
protection devices. Similarly, once a bank has collapsed, the political pressure
49. Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory Interpretation:
An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 223. 229 (1986) ("Market forces provide strong incentives
for politicians to enact laws that serve private rather than public interests and hence statutes are supplied
by lawmakers to the political groups or coalitions that outbid competing groups. ").
50. Jonathan R. Macey, Transaction Costs and the Nonnative Elements of the Public Choice
Model: An Application 10 Constitutional Theory, 74 VA. L. REV. 471, 478-80 (1988).
51. In particular, smaller banks benefit from this credit enhancement. See Roe, supra note 2, at
1975-76.
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for a government bailout can become very great, since the creditors have
incentives to form an effective political coalition demanding repayment on the
grounds that government supervision created a reasonable expectation of
government protection from risk of loss.
The existence of sweeping government guarantees for banks helps the
banking industry in other, more subtle ways. First, because the protection is
contingent, it does not appear in the government's budget as an expenditure
and so does not increase the size of the government's budget deficit-at least
until the guarantee is called upon in the event of bank failure. This makes it
a relatively cheap form of political benefit for politicians to supply. Moreover,
creditor protection is attractive to bankers and politicians because, by making
creditors indifferent to bank failure, such protection removes bank safety as
a salient political issue, an important benefit for politicians since bank failure
has in the past toppled governments.52 Government protection for bank
creditors renders depositors less sensitive to the rate of bank failures in the
economy. Thus, despite the strong economic arguments in favor of forcing
depositors to face risk of loss, most advanced economies nevertheless provide
either explicit or implicit guarantees to bank depositors (although few, if any,
provide guarantees as extensive and costly as those available under U.S. law).
C. The Continuing Existence ofDeposit Insurance
In our view, the social costs of deposit insurance are so high-as
illustrated by the catastrophic losses taxpayers incurred in the savings and loan
debacle of the 1980S53-as to suggest the desirability of repealing all forms
of government-sponsored insurance. Repeal of deposit insurance, if it were
politically feasible, would not only protect the government against such
catastrophic losses in the future but would also eliminate the need for many
costly regulations now imposed on the banking industry in order to protect the
government against its contingent liability.
It appears unlikely, however, that Congress will scale back or repeal
government-sponsored deposit insurance, at least in the short run. As we have
52. The paradigmatic example of a government's collapse due to bank failure is the resignation
of the Austrian government on June 18, 1931 following the May 11, 1931 collapse of Austria's largest
bank, the Kreditanstalt. The closure of over one-third of American banks between 1931 and 1933 bad
a significant effect upon President Hoover's political fortunes. JONATHAN DAVID ARONSON, MONEY
AND PoWER 27-37 (1977). A bank failure today is unlikely to topple a government; however, such a
failure might well be sufficient to result in changing particular elected representatives. In this sense,
while the systematic threat to government of a bank failure is not large, the political costs of bank failure
to particular representatives may continue to be quite high. See, e.g., KATHLEEN DAY, S & L HELL
307-27 (1993).
53. The total estimated cost of these failures is $150 billion and rising. James R. Barth & R. Dan
Brumbaugh, Jr., Depository Institution Failures and Future Costs: The Role of the Moral Hazard and
Agency Problems, in REBUILDING PUBLIC CONFIDENCE THROUGH FiNANCIAL REFORM, 1992 OIUO ST.
C. OF Bus. CONF. PROC.
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noted, deposit insurance tends to be a popular program. In spite of the disaster
of the 1980s, Congress has not reduced the insurance ceiling-clearly excessive
for the protection of small depositors-of $100,000 per depositor per
institution. 54
Notwithstanding these difficulties, devices for facilitating the phase-out
of deposit insurance are worth exploring. Other countries have attempted to
repeal their systems of deposit insurance. Argentina, for example, reacted
against large losses in its deposit insurance system by enacting legislation that
prohibits the central bank from making good on depositor losses and severely
restricts the availability of lesser measures such as temporary liquidity
assistance.55 This promise not to bail out bank depositors is backed not only
by legislation, but also by express commitments from principal governmental
officials. 56 Beyond this, any attempt by the Argentine government to payoff
depositors would probably undo the program of monetary reform that has been
the centerpiece of Argentina's recent economic recovery.57
Although the Argentinian experience is obviously distinct from that of the
United States, the fact that a major economy has succeeded in taking effective
measures to repeal its program of deposit insurance suggests that similar
reforms should not be ruled out altogether, at least in the long run. For
effective reform to take place, it will be necessary for the economy to offer
small savers an investment vehicle that emulates the desirable features of
insured deposits: a highly secure account that consumers can use to conduct
economic transactions while earning a modicum of interest on savings. It is
not commonly realized that such a vehicle already exists in the United States,
without the backing of deposit insurance: money market mutual funds backed
by short-term government securities. These funds are extraordinarily secure
and offer transaction services which increasingly emulate the services offered
by insured deposit accounts. If consumers come to recognize the functional
interchangeability between these uninsured accounts and traditional insured
deposit accounts, it may be possible to reduce deposit insurance gradually,
eventually converting it into an optional and strictly limited program for banks
and thrift institutions.
In the short run, however, it is clear that deposit insurance is a feature
of the American political landscape. Given that the government does not have
the willpower, under current conJitions, to allow a major bank to fail without
54. PHILLIP F. BARTHOLOMEW, CONGo BUDGET OFF., REFORMING FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE
34-37 (Sheila Harty ed., 1990).
55. See Geoffrey Miller, Politics ofDeposit Insurance Reform: The Case ofArgentina, 1 U. CHI.
L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 129 (1994).
56. Id. at 148.
57. See id. at 137-41.
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protecting its depositors, the question becomes what, as a practical matter, can
be done to minimize the costs and perverse effects of the program.
D. Alternative Justifications for Deposit Insurance
The best argument for deposit insurance protection in an imperfect world
is that, in the absence of explicit guarantees, there will be considerable
confusion about the actual extent of the government's commitment to
depositors. This confusion will create pressure on the government to bail out
all depositors in case of loss. In part this is because of the political costs to
politicians of allowing large losses to fall on a potentially powerful political
coalition-frustrated depositors-and in part it is because the existence of
pervasive systems of bank regulation and supervision by central bankers and
other regulators gives rise to the expectation that bank depositors are protected
by the government. 58
Thus, deposit insurance might be justified, not because it places a cap on
the amount of money that can be lost by depositors, but because it enables a
democratic government to make a credible commitment to bank depositors ex
ante that limits the amount of the government's exposure to the amount of the
deposit guarantee. Without such an explicit limit, fixed claimants in banks can
argue that they relied on the pervasive system of government oversight and
regulation and that therefore the government should indemnify them for their
losses. Of course, it must be remembered that the justification for government-
sponsored deposit insurance programs is that such programs deter even more
sweeping intervention later on, as has happened in Sweden and Israel and, for
a time, the United States, when the government sent signals that all creditors
would be protected in case of bank failure.
An alternative regulatory strategy is called "constructive ambiguity."
Under this approach, the government offers a set of vague guarantees as a
substitute for explicit depositor protection. The argument for constructive
ambiguity is that some of the perverse effects of regulation on market actors'
incentives can be reduced if there is ambiguity about how regulators will
respond to particular events. Thus, for example, if bankers do not know that
the deposits in their banks will be protected in the case of bank failure because
the government's plans for dealing with crisis are ambiguous, they mig"t
refrain from excessive risk-taking. And if customers do not know that the
government will protect them from loss, they will monitor the activities of their
banks. Unfortunately, constructive ambiguity has had a mixed record, at best,
with respect to deposit insurance guarantees. Constructive ambiguity can
58. Thus it is not surprising that, in both Israel and Sweden, the two industrialized cO!intries
without explicit protection for depositors, the government responded to domestic banking crises by
issuing blanket govenllnent guarantees to all fixed claimants. Macey, supra note 37, at 78-79.
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produce the worst of all worlds, because creditors, particularly foreign
creditors, may demand a risk premium for investing in banks without explicit
government guarantees, while bankers and depositors can play a game of
chicken with regulators, in the belief that it will be political suicide for the
government to decline to protect uninsured depositors. Ambiguity of this sort
is an implicit part of any bank regulatory system in which people are led to
believe that the government may-or may not-intervene to protect some or
all of the creditors of an insolvent bank above the amounts specified in the
insurance limits set by law.
The European Union (EU) directives remove constructive ambiguity by
requiring that banks in the EU protect consumers on at least the first $19,200
of deposits. S9 Also, in the wake of the collapse of the Bank of Commerce and
Credit International, the EU has decided that the responsibility for providing
deposit insurance protection should belong to the country that supervises the
consolidated bank, not the host country. 60 The regulatory hypothesis
developed here raises the question whether the relatively low levels of
protection offered by the EU are high enough to represent a credible
commitment on the part of regulators not to bail out depositors whose
investments exceed the minimums. If depositors can claim credibly that they
could not fend for themselves, and that they reasonably expected that their
deposits would be protected in higher amounts than the EU minimums, then
the pressure on political actors to provide significantly higher levels of
protection may be irresistible.
Conclusion
In this Article we have examined the checking account hypothesis and the
transformation hypothesis, efficiency-based explanations offered by economists
to account for the remarkable combination of financial intermediation and
transactional services offered by banks. We have argued that these traditional
economic justifications, however valid they may have been in the past, have
been weakened considerably by changing market conditions and new
technologies that have given rise to superior, low-cost substitutes for the
services traditionally offered by banks. An alternative economic explanation
for the mismatch between the term structure of banks' assets and liabilities is
Calomiris and Kahn's monitoring hypothesis. This hypothesis cannot justify
the existence of deposit insurance because deposit insurance deprives investors
of the incentives to monitor that underlie the monitoring hypothesis itself.
59. Richard J. Herring, Divergent Regulatory Refonn in the Major Banking Markets, in
REBUILDING PUBLIC CONFIDENCE THROUGH FINANCIAL REFORM, supra note 53, at 61.
60. [d.
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We have also argued that a better explanation for the persistence of the
mismatch in the term structure of banks' assets and liabilities is a regulatory
hypothesis. Under this hypothesis, the mismatch is explained as the means by
which banks maximize the amount of the subsidy they obtain from the .credit
enhancement that government sponsored deposit insurance programs represent.
Our analysis of the decline of the economic justifications for the mismatch
in the term structure of banks' assets and liabilities has important implications
for the policy debate concerning the need for federally sponsored deposit
insurance programs. We argued that the desirable public policy would be to
phase out and eventually eliminate this costly and poorly-designed program.
Political reality, however, dictates that deposit insurance remain in place, at
least in the short term. This reality is a result of the pervasive systems of
government regulation and monitoring for banks that exist in every developed
country, which cause depositors to expect to be bailed out in case of bank
failure. In most developed countries, governments and citizens have an implicit
agreement that depositors will be protected against loss in case of bank failure.
If the government does not limit its exposure through deposit insurance, it may
end up bailing out all depositors. Attempts to limit deposit insurance must be
explicit and transparent, and must reliably precommit the government not to
bail out depositors in toto. Ideally, this would involve a promise not to insure
deposits at all. In light of contemporary realities, however, deposit insurance
enables the government as insurer to make a credible commitment to cap its
losses in cases of bank failure to the amounts specified in the regulations.
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